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CONTRACTS
I. MATERIAL ALTERATION RULE: PROTECTION FOR
SUBORDINATED PURCHASE MONEY MORTGAGES
In Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Smith,1 the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that a seller's purchase money
mortgage had priority over a subsequent mortgage despite a
valid subordination agreement with the debtor. The new mort-
gagee lost its priority by materially altering the terms of its loan
without the knowledge or consent of the subordinated purchase
money mortgagee. In this decision, the court adopts a new rule
to protect sellers who have subordinated purchase money
mortgages.
The dispute in this case arose from a complex real estate
transaction. In December 1973, LaBorde sold undeveloped land
to developers Smith and Williams in return for a purchase
money mortgage.' LaBorde agreed to subordinate his mortgage
to enable the developers to obtain money to develop the land.
This agreement also contained a written provision whereby
LaBorde agreed to execute any documents necessary to perfect
subordination.$ When LaBorde learned that the developers had
granted an additional mortgage to Citizens & Southern National
Bank (C & S) without advising him, he filed a lis pendens.4
In March 1974, LaBorde and the developers reached a set-
tlement, agreeing that the purchase money mortgage would be
1. - S.C. -, 284 S.E.2d 770 (1981).
2. The land, located in Richland County, consisted of three parcels. Two of the par-
cels were conveyed directly by LaBorde to Smith and Williams by deed dated December
11, 1973. The third parcel was the subject of this litigation. LaBorde gave a portion of
this third parcel to three charities and retained title to the remaining portion. On the
same day, all of these portions were deeded to Smith and Williams by LaBorde and the
three charities in exchange for purchase money mortgages. Brief for Appellant at 3-5.
The three charities appealed only the value and apportionment of the various mortgages.
3. On appeal to the supreme court, C & S asserted that this original subordination
agreement was self-executing. LaBorde contended that the provision required his written
consent for the subordination to be effective. - S.C. at _, 284 S.E.2d at 771. The
court, however, found it unnecessary to resolve this issue. See infra note 5 and accompa-
hying text.
4. Brief for Respondent LaBorde at 3.
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satisfied and replaced by a new mortgage. LaBorde also agreed
to subordinate this new mortgage to any future mortgages pro-
vided the developers satisfied the C & S mortgage by June 7,
1974 and paid LaBorde $4,000. 5 LaBorde complied fully with the
terms of the agreement. The developers, however, obtained an
extension of the loan from C & S postponing repayment for one
year. LaBorde was not advised of this extension. When the de-
velopers failed to satisfy the outstanding purchase money mort-
gage and pay LaBorde $4,000 pursuant to the March agreement,
LaBorde foreclosed.'
The issue of priority was first determined by a master in
equity. The master found there was no evidence showing that
the extension of time by C & S prejudiced LaBorde7 and denied
him priority. On appeal, the trial judge, finding prejudice to
LaBorde, held that his mortgage had priority over the C & S
mortgage.8 The supreme court affirmed.9
The supreme court reasoned that C & S lost its priority be-
cause it modified the terms of its mortgage in a manner that
prejudiced LaBorde's rights without his knowledge or consent.10
The court cited the rule that: "[If] the terms of the debt are
materially altered without the subordinated mortgagee's con-
sent, the priority of the mortgages will be reversed in favor of
the subordinated purchase money mortgage."' The court then
stated that the finding of prejudice by the trial judge was sup-
ported by evidence that LaBorde considered repayment of the C
5. - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 771-72. The court found it unnecessary to resolve
whether the original subordination agreement was self-executing because LaBorde ac-
knowledged the superiority of the C & S mortgage in this subsequent agreement. Id. at
284 S.E.2d at 771-72. See supra note 3.
6. Brief for Respondent LaBorde at 4.
7. Record at 459.
8. The trial judge noted that extension of the repayment date "reduced the chances
of a successful recovery by suit of LaBorde." Record at 532.
9. C & S has filed a petition for rehearing.
10. - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 772.
11. Id. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 772. In support of this rule, the court cited Remodeling
& Construction Corp. v. Melker, 270 A.D. 1053, 65 N.Y.S.2d 738 (1946); 59 C.J.S. Mort-
gages, § 276 (1979); G. OSBORNE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF MORTGAGES § 121 (2d ed.
1970). The court also quoted from Gluskin v. Atlantic Savings & Loan Ass'n, 32 Cal.
App. 3d 307, 315, 108 Cal. Rptr. 318, 323 (1973): "[A] lender and a borrower may not
bilaterally make a material modification in the loan to which the seller has subordinated
without the knowledge and consent of the seller to that modification, if the modification
materially affects the seller's rights."
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& S debt on June 7, 1974 a material inducement for subordinat-
ing his purchase money mortgage. Accordingly, LaBorde's prior-
ity over C & S was affirmed."2
The material alteration rule on which the court based its
decision is generally applied in land development financing dis-
putes.13 Typically, a purchase money mortgagee sells to a devel-
oper who then takes a loan from a lender to finance develop-
ment of the land. By law, the seller's purchase money mortgage
has priority.14 Subordination by the seller is necessary to allow
the lending bank to obtain the requisite first priority lien to se-
cure its loan.' 5 The seller, however, risks being denied full satis-
faction of the debt by subordinating his lien."6 Other courts have
used the material alteration rule to protect sellers in this vulner-
able position.
12. - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 772.
13. See generally G. OSBORNE, supra note 11, § 212, at 387; Note, Subordination of
Purchase-Money Security, 52 CAL. L. REv. 157, 157 (1964); Miller, Starr, & Regalia,
Subordination Agreements in California, 13 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1298, 1298-300 (1966).
14. - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 771; Crystal Ice Co. v. First Colonial Corp., 273
S.C. 306, 310, 257 S.E.2d 496, 498 (1979). In Crystal Ice, the court found two reasons for
purchase money mortgage priority- (1) the executions of the deed and purchase money
mortgage are simultaneous acts and no mortgage arising through the mortgagor can at-
tach before the purchase money mortgage; (2) the seller would not have parted with his
property without having recourse if buyer defaulted and equity favors granting priority
to the purchase money mortgage. See also, G. OSBORNE, supra, note 12 at § 213.
15. Generally, banks and other lending institutions must obtain first lien rights in
order to secure a loan with realty. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-13-20 (1976); S.C. CODE ANN.,
BANKING, COMMERCIAL PAPER AND FiNANcE R. 15-9 (1976); 12 U.S.C. §
1464(c)(1971)(limits on federally chartered lenders).
16. Problems arise when the sum of the seller's and lender's mortgages is greater
than the value of the property. In the event of default and a foreclosure sale, the pro-
ceeds cannot satisfy both mortgages. Since the subordinated seller holds a junior lien
mortgage, he will be denied full satisfaction of his debt.
17. See, e.g., Gluskin v. Atlantic Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 32 Cal. App. 3d 307, 108 Cal.
Rptr. 318 (1973). Courts have also protected sellers by requiring specificity of terms in
the subordination contract. See, e.g., Handy v. Gordon, 65 Cal. 2d 578, 581, 422 P.2d 329,
330-31, 55 Cal. Rptr. 769, 770-71 (1967).
California seems to have had more litigation concerning subordination than any
other state. One California commentator writes:
Subordination has received sparse treatment by legal writers, and the
cases are not numerous. The law that does exist has evolved almost entirely
since 1954, and the opinions indicate that an "equitable" result has often been
more important than the reasoning by which that result was achieved. In a
series of consistent efforts to relieve the seller from a disastrous bargain the
cases have cast serious doubt upon the efficacy of the subordination procedure.
Note, Subordination of Purchase-Money Security, 52 CAL. L. Rav. 157, 159 (1964).
19821
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The court's view of prejudice to the seller in Smith indi-
cates broad protection of a subordinated purchase money mort-
gage. In finding prejudice, the court did not undertake a factual
analysis beyond indicating that LaBorde considered timely re-
payment of the bank's loan a material inducement for subordi-
nating his mortgage."' This subjective view of prejudice does not
examine whether modification actually increased LaBorde's risk
of loss. On the contrary, extension by C & S would allow the
debtors to avoid default and foreclosure, thereby decreasing
LaBorde's risk of loss as a junior lienholder.19 The court's analy-
sis seems to imply that a modification without consent is itself
sufficient to constitute prejudice.
In conclusion, Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Smith
should serve to warn lending institutions that they have a duty
not to prejudice the rights of a purchase money mortgagee hold-
ing a subordinated lien. Extension of the repayment date on the
lender's mortgage seems to constitute prejudice and the court
appears willing to grant priority to a subordinated purchase
money mortgage if consent has not been obtained.
II. GUARANTOR DISCHARGE By CREDITOR'S RELEASE OF
SECURITY
In Edge v. Klutts Resort Realty,20 the South Carolina Su-
preme Court acknowledged a mortgagee's right to ignore the
mortgage and sue the maker of the debt for collection on the
note alone.21 The court also joined a majority of American juris-
18. - S.C. at -, 284 S.E.2d at 772.
19. See supra note 16. Other courts have found that a subordinated mortgagee is
prejudiced when modification results in a shortened term for repayment because the
likelihood of the debtor's default is enhanced. See, e.g., Gluskin v. Atlantic Say. & Loan
Ass'n, 32 Cal. App. 3d 307, 315, 108 Cal. Rptr. 318, 325 (1973); Remodeling & Construc-
tion Corp. v. Melker, 270 A.D. 1053, 65 N.Y.S.2d 738, 741 (1946).
20. 276 S.C. 389, 278 S.E.2d 783 (1981).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Sims, 586 F.2d 580, (5th Cir. 1978); Fidelit* Sav. Bank
v. Wormhoudt Lumber Co., 251 Iowa 1121, 104 N.W.2d 462 (1962); Sterling Factors
Corp. v. Freeman, 50 Misc.2d 715, 271 N.Y.S.2d 343, affd 27 A.D.2d 856, 279 N.Y.S.2d
577 (1966); Warren v. Washington Trust Bank, 92 Wash. 2d 381, 598 P.2d 701 (1979).
See 10 WILLISTON ON CoNTRAcTs § 1232 (3d ed. 1957); RESTATEMENT OF SECURITY § 132,
Comment b (1941); G. BRANDT, THE LAW OF SuRETYsHIP AND GuARANTY VOL. I, § 480 (3D
ED. 1905). See generally, 38 AM. JuR. 2D Guaranty § 84 (1968); 38 C.J.S. Guaranty § 81
(1943).
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dictions in holding that a creditor's release of a security without
the guarantor's consent discharges the guarantor only to the ex-
tent of the value of the security, or the amount by which he was
actually injured.22
In 1972, defendant Klutts Resort Realty (Klutts Realty) ex-
ecuted a promissory note to plaintiff Edge to obtain funds to
build a condominium. The note was secured by a purchase
money mortgage on a four acre tract of land. As agreed, plaintiff
subordinated his mortgage to one given to North Carolina Na-
tional Bank Mortgage Corporation (N.C.N.B.). Two years later,
Edge agreed to further subordinate his mortgage to a second
N.C.N.B. mortgage in return for personal guarantees given by J.
V. Klutts and P. W. Bradham, the two co-directors of Klutts
Realty.
As a result of financial difficulties, Klutts Realty conveyed
to N.C.N.B. the property securing the plaintiff's note in lieu of
foreclosure by N.C.N.B. and in consideration for releasing J. V.
Klutts and P. W. Bradham from personal liability. Simultane-
ously, Edge cancelled his mortgage at N.C.N.B.'s request. Edge,
however, by explicit language, did not cancel the debt owed to
him by Klutts Realty. As consideration for the mortgage cancel-
lation, N.C.N.B. paid Edge a sum and agreed to pay him a per-
centage of the proceeds from condominium sales. After applying
amounts received from N.C.N.B. to the note, the plaintiff
brought an action against Klutts Realty as the maker of the note
and J.V. Klutts and P.W. Bradham as guarantors to recover the
balance due. The trial judge granted summary judgment for all
the defendants, holding that when a creditor releases a security
without the guarantor's consent, the debt is discharged. On ap-
peal, the supreme court reversed and remanded.' s
In reversing summary judgment for Klutts Realty, the su-
preme court held that a mortgagee can ignore the mortgage and
sue the maker of the debt for collection on the note alone.' Al-
though the court did not expressly state the reason for this rule,
it is consistent with the court's holding in Perpetual Building &
22. 276 S.C. 393, 278 S.E.2d at 785.
23. Id. at 390, 278 S.E.2d at 784.
24. Id. at 392, 278 S.E.2d at 785. See L. JONES, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MORT-
GAGES OF REAL PROPERTY VOL. Im, § 1572 (8th ed. 1928); See generally, 55 Am. JuR2D
Mortgages § 536 (1971); 59 C.J.S. Mortgages, § 4895 (1949).
1982]
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Loan Ass'n v. Braun.25 In Perpetual Building, the court rea-
soned that a mortgage is not payment of an obligation, but se-
curity for it.28 The supreme court's recognition of this indepen-
dence of security and debt suggests that a debt can be satisfied
by looking to either the note, as evidence of the debt,2 7 or to the
mortgage as security for the debt.28
In deciding the issue of whether Klutts and Bradham, as
individual guarantors, had consented to the plaintiff's release of
the mortgage, the supreme court also reversed summary judg-
ment and remanded the case to the trial court for a determina-
tion of the factual issue of consent. The court concluded that, in
any event, the plaintiff's failure to obtain the guarantors' con-
sent prior to releasing the mortgage would only discharge the
debt to the extent of the value of the security surrendered, or
the amount by which the guarantors were actually damaged.2 9
This is the rule in a majority of American jurisdictions.3 Based
on principles of equity, the rule stems from the possible impair-
ment of a guarantor's right to subrogation;31 that is, the right to
use the security to satisfy the debt.
The court's decision in Edge raises questions concerning the
either-or formulation of this rule of guaranty law. As stated by
the court, the guarantor is discharged by the amount of the ac-
tual injury to his financial status or by the value of the security.
Conceptually, the two amounts are different sides of the same
coin. Because the security represents the guarantor's right to
subrogation, a diminution in the value of the security should
cause an equal diminution in the financial status of the guaran-
tor. Therefore, the guarantor is injured by the amount that the
security is diminished. However, a practical difference may exist
between the two methods for determining the amount of dis-
charge. The value of the security would be determined by look-
25. 270 S.C. 338, 242 S.E.2d 407 (1978).
26. Id. at 340, 242 S.E.2d at 408.
27. See, e.g., Riegel v. Belt, 1190 Ohio St. 369, 379, 164 N.E. 347, 350 (1928); Ander-
son v. Warren, 196 Okla. 251, 253, 164 P.2d 221, 223 (1945).
28. See, e.g., Pioneer Credit Co. v. Latendresse, 286 N.W.2d 445, 447 (N.D. 1979);
Mardirossian v. Wilder, 76 N.J. Super. 37, 40, 183 A.2d 761, 762 (1962); Matthews v.
Hinton, 234 Cal. App. 2d 736, 742, 44 Cal. Rptr. 692, 696 (1965).
29. 276 S.C. at 393, 278 S.E.2d at 785.
30. See supra note 21.
31. See WILLISTON, supra note 21, G. BRANDT, supra note 21.
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ing to its market value, 2 while injury to the guarantor might be
determined by examining the change in the guarantor's financial
or legal status. In Edge, the court seems to have chosen the lat-
ter approach by focusing on the actual effect of the creditor's
actions on the guarantors' financial status.33
Edge v. Klutts Resort Realty evidences the South Carolina
Supreme Court's recognition that a note and a mortgage furnish
a creditor with separate and distinct causes of action. This case
further suggests the court's concern for an equitable resolution
of the guarantor's rights based on a factual determination of ac-
tual injury.
Ben A. Hagood, Jr.
32. See, e.g., Sterling Factors Corp. v. Freeman, 50 Misc. 2d 715, 271 N.Y.S.2d 343,
aff'd 27 A.D.2d 959, 279 N.Y.S.2d 577 (1966).
33. The court found that Klutts and Bradham were not injured by the mortgage
cancellation. Indeed, the cancellation brought about the advantages of releasing them
from personal liability on the debt to N.C.N.B. and reduction of the debt owed to Edge.
Thus, the court disapproved of their attempt to receive the additional benefits of release
from the note. 276 S.C. at 393, 278 S.E.2d at 785.
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